This study evaluates the interest rate forecast efforts of U.S. banks, insurance companies, other financial service companies, research-and consulting institutes, associations, and industrial companies. Subjects of analysis are 10-year US-Government bond yield forecasts and 3-month US-Treasury bill rate forecasts for the period between October 1989 and December 2004. In total 134 forecasts time series with more than 14,000 forecast data are scrutinized. This makes it the most extensive analysis of interest rate forecasts so far. Forecast error measures are Theil's U 2 , TOTA coefficient, and the forecast quality matrix. All of the 134 forecast time series lag behind reality. Most of them prove to be inferior to the naïve forecast.
INTRODUCTION
Forecasts of the future interest rate development are of fundamental importance for many business decisions. This especially holds for the banking sector. Commercial banks obtain a substantial profit contribution by maturity transformations. In which design and to which extent these maturity transformations are useful depends on the present and expected future interest rate development. Only if reliable interest rate forecasts can be generated the risks arising from maturity transformations shrink to a manageable residual.
Interest rate forecasts are indispensable requirements for the successful implementation of active portfolio management strategies in the bond market. Both the proprietary trading and the asset management departments of investment banks thus depend on reliable interest rate forecasts. Among others, fundamental stock market-and exchange rate forecasts are usually based on interest rate forecasts. Research departments also work out interest rate forecasts as input for further forecasts of the financial market.
Industrial companies create interest rate forecasts to achieve the best possible timing for their investments. Capital procurement cost in a high interest rate phase can amount to many times over the cost of finance in a low interest rate phase. Also, with regard to the future, medium-and long-term price policies should consider the interest rate as a cost issue.
Against the background of the important role interest rate forecasts play for various financial areas of responsibility within banks and industrial companies it is of special interest if, and if so, to which extent, U.S. companies succeed in dealing with this task.
This study takes up a series of examinations with various results. Throop (1981) concludes that the reviewed estimations of market professionals lead to better forecast results than an autoregressive forecasting equation based on the past history of the interest rate. Belongia (1987) shows that the reviewed interest rate forecasts by analysts in less than 50% foresee the correct development trend. Additionally, the estimates made by analysts prove to be inferior to the naïve forecast. Dua (1988) comes to mixed conclusions. Depending on examined forecast subject, forecast horizon, and forecasting period the forecasts are partly better and partly worse than the naïve forecast. In a further comparison of interest rate forecasts of different market experts with the naïve forecast Hafer and Hein (1989) establish that, depending on the reviewed period of time and the applied forecast error measure, sometimes the naïve forecast and sometimes the analysts' forecast provide minimally better results. This impression is widely confirmed in the later study of Hafer, Hein, and MacDonald (1992) . Domian (1992) argues that money market mutual funds which are able to forecast interest rates should lengthen their maturities before a drop in rates, and shorten their maturities before a rise in rates. An examination of the maturity structures of the reviewed funds shows that the fund managers were not able to predict the future interest rate development. In a similar study Francis (1991) examines commercial bank exposure positions. The intuition is that the management of exposure to interest rate risk reveals the banks' implicit forecast of interest rates. It emerges that changes in the exposure position are unrelated to later changes of the interest rate level. Kolb and Stekler (1996) show that interest rate forecasts by market experts were not significantly better than random walk forecasts. 1989 -1999 Opposed to this Gosnell and Kolb (1997) find that the reviewed interest rate forecasts by market experts were if only a little, but discernible better than naïve forecasts.
Albrecht (2000) and Spiwoks (2003) show that interest rate forecasts by German banks predict future interest rate developments less correctly than corresponding naïve forecasts. Greer (2003) establishes that the reviewed analysts' estimates have a better forecast quality than the random walk forecast.
Further research efforts are necessary for the following reasons: 1. A number of existing studies present significantly differing results. 2. In some studies the data basis is rather small, because either only six-monthly or quarterly data were evaluated, the reviewed period of time is relatively short, or because only few market experts were included in the study. 3. An investigation of ten-year US-Government bond yield forecasts is still outstanding (Table I) .
This study therefore focuses on the evaluation of ten-year US-Government bond yield forecasts and three-month US-Treasury bill rate forecasts which were monthly published by 34 banks, insurance companies and other financial services companies, research-and consulting institutes, associations and industrial companies between October 1989 and December 2003 (Chapter "Empirical Results") . The underlying methods are presented in the next Chapter, while the data base is defined in the Chapter after next. A summary of research results as well as the conclusion follows in the last Chapter.
METHODS
Let us assume that a black box generates a quantifyable event in regular time intervals. We can observe the time series of these events, but we have no insight whatsoever into the processes occuring inside the black box, and how the visible results were generated. Let us also assume that despite our complete ignorance we have to make a forecast on the future tendency of the time series. As we have no information on the genesis of events, both the future increasing and decreasing course of the time series are equally probable. Thus it seems sensible to assume an unchanged situation in the future (naïve forecast). This idea goes back to the French mathematician Pierre Simon
Laplace (1814), who introduced it into the literature as the "principle of insufficient reason". Since then the naïve forecast has been judged as the rock-bottom of forecast quality. Even if nothing is known about the forecast subject, the forecast quality of a naïve forecast can be achieved without effort. If a market expert at least roughly understands the processes to be forecast, his forecasts should have a significantly better quality than naïve forecasts.
Henri Theil (1955 Theil ( , 1966 Theil ( , 1971 Financial market forecasts which are continually adjusted to actual market developments may, in the worst case, completely lose their future-oriented character. Therefore it is of special interest if a forecast is marked by topically orientated trend adjustment behavior. The TOTA coefficient (see Andres and Spiwoks, 1999, pp. 531-534, or Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003, p. 444) can be used to identify this characteristic.
To calculate the TOTA coefficient at first the coefficient of determination of the forecast data and the actual events are calculated (R 
1 Following case shall serve as an example: A market expert totally used to rely on the naïve forecast for years; he always forecasts the actual value for the future. Just at one single forecast date he makes a bet and flips a coin. Heads mean he fixes the forecast value minimally below the actual value. Tails mean he fixes the forecast value minimally above the actual varible. Be it tails and the forecasted value incidentally increases in the forecast period of time, U 2 has a value of < 1, although the market expert has had no clear idea of the future development. For a forecast time series to be systematically better than the time series of naïve forecasts, the correlation of forecasts and actually values must be so close that Theil's U 2 < 0,4. Theil defined this borderline for Theil's old inequality coefficient (U 1 ). In analogy it can be also used for U 2 . See Theil (1961), p. 32.
With h : Forecast horizon
If the value of the TOTA coefficient is < 1, a topically oriented trend adjustment must be assumed. In this case the forecast time series transferred back to its time of emergence shows a higher correspondence with the actual values than the forecast time series at the time of its validity with the actual values. For TOTA coefficient < 1 the forecast time series stronger reflects the presence than the future.
The understanding of the quality of forecast time series can be significantly improved if apart from Theil's U 2 also the TOTA coefficient is considered. TOTA coefficient was developed by Andres and Spiwoks (1999) . It has received attention especially since Bofinger, one of the highly ranked economics consultants of the German government, has taken up this analysis tool and applied it in several studies (a. o. see Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003; Bofinger and Schmidt, 2004; Leitner, Schmidt, and Bofinger, 2003) .
With the help of Theil's U 2 and the TOTA coefficient now four different forecast qualities can be differentiated in the forecast quality matrix (see Andres and Spiwoks, 1999, pp. 535-536; Spiwoks, 2004, pp. 563-564) . On the one hand it is taken into account if the reviewed forecast time series is better or worse than the corresponding time series of naïve forecasts. On the other hand there is the separation into existing and non-existing topically oriented trend adjustments. If these two distinctive features are combined the quality forecast matrix ( Figure 13 ) emerges, with which the following four forecast categories could be set up:
1. The quasi-naïve forecast (U 2 > 1; TOTA < 1): This forecast quality is lower than that of the naïve forecast. A further significant characteristic is its topically oriented trend adjustment. The market expert was not able to make proper assumptions about future events. Instead he was closely oriented at the development of the variable to be forecast at the time of making the forecast. Focused on the current data he was not better able to judge the trend of development (increasing or decreasing) than using the naïve forecast. Such a forecast is definitely not suited as the basis of decision-making.
2. The directional forecast (U 2 < 1; TOTA < 1): Although this forecast time series shows a topically oriented trend adjustment, considering the actual value it still meets the development trend better than the respective time series of naïve forecast. For many decisions it is highly significant to estimate the degree of expected change. This forecast type can not deliver the necessary valuable information. Yet, for many issues it can be very helpful to know the correct development trend. Therefore, within limits, the directional forecast suits as a basis of decision-making.
3. The vain forecast (U 2 > 1; TOTA > 1): In this case the effort to forecast the future without defining the market development as dominating factor, was not successful. Although this forecast time series shows no topically oriented trend adjustment, the forecast quality is not higher than the time series of naïve forecasts. Therefore this forecast category does not deliver a suitable basis for financial decisions.
4. The future-depicting forecast (U 2 < 1; TOTA > 1): This forecast time series presents a significantly higher quality than the time series of naïve forecasts and is not dominated by the phenomenon of topically oriented trend adjustments. The market experts recognized the facts of future development without having been influenced too much by the market developments at the time of making the forecast. This forecast category is undoubtedly the one best suited as the basis for decision-making.
The differentiation between vain forecast and quasi-naïve forecast is especially helpful to assess the market experts, and to demonstrate possibilities of improvement. It is important to know if mainly an inappropriately strong orientation at current market events at the time of making the forecast has to be corrected, or if the model underlying the forecast does not reflect reality. The differentiation between directional forecast and future-depicting forecast is important regarding the usability of the forecast.
If the degree of future market developments is important for the decision-making, a directional forecast is not sufficient.
This study uses Theil's U 2 and the TOTA coefficient as criteria. They allow a thorough characterization of the reviewed forecast time series within the forecast quality matrix. As an introduction some forecast time series are graphically analyzed to simplify an intuitive understanding of the character of forecast time series. Bates and Granger (1969) were the first to ask if through the combination of forecasts better forecast results could be achieved. This is based on the idea that each of the existing forecasts contains useful information on future events, and that these sets of in- provides an absolute interest rate low of 3.4% whereas the forecast suggests a local interest rate high of 5.7%.
DATA
Yet, it is apparent that the forecast time series corresponds with the actual interest rate development in a certain way. The forecast time series seems to be a delayed image of the factual interest rate development; the forecast lags behind reality. This is especially recognizable when the forecast data are each shifted left for the forecast horizon (12 months), so that the forecast data are no longer attributed to their respective points of validity but to their respective points of time of emergence (Figure 2 ). This projection indicates that the market experts were highly influenced by the current market situation. It could be claimed that not the future, but merely the presence is "forecast".
There is obviously a topically oriented trend adjustment for this time series. The TOTA coefficient value is 0.387 and thus confirms the topically oriented trend ad- with a forecast horizon of 12 months a TOTA coefficient < 1 is calculated (Table II) .
Thus all 34 cases reflect a significant topically oriented trend adjustment.
Theil's U 2 > 1 is the result to be found for 29 of the 34 forecast time series (Table II) .
In this cases a consistent orientation at the naïve forecast would thus have led to better (albeit not good!) forecast results. 
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Even worse are the results of the 10-year Government bond yield forecasts with a forecast horizon of three months (see Figures 9-10 and Table III) . In all cases the TOTA coefficient is < 1, and Theil's U 2 is > 1. So without exception these are quasinaïve forecasts. The 3-month Treasury bill rate forecasts are hardly more successful (see Figures 11-12 and Tables IV and V) .
As a summary it can be established that all 134 reviewed forecast time series have a TOTA coefficient < 1. Also the exemplary graphic analysis shows that the analysts are strongly oriented at the current, or past, market situation when they generate their 117 of the134 reviewed forecast time series must be assigned to the category of quasinaïve forecasts. They are definitely not suited as the basis of investment decisions.
Given that the other 17 forecast time series only marginally fall below the U 2 -threshold value of 1 they provide no reliable basis for decision-making, either.
The question arises how it can be possible that, while the most market experts, when doing their forecasts, are strongly oriented at the actual market situation, not more of them managed to achieve an U 2 -value of just below 1 -even if this was merely accidental. A look at the graphic presentation of the data clarifies this (Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12) .
The bad results can probably be put down to the fact that all relevant market developments are mirrored in the forecasts with a delay of one to three months. To put it more pointedly: The examined institutions did not forecast the future. They have not even been able to "forecast" the presence, which would have led to U 2 -values of around 1.
In fact they merely re-established in their forecasts the interest rate development of the prior one to three months -they "forecast" the past.
This time lag of course stronger affects short forecast horizons than longer ones, and it explains why the forecast success of forecast time series with a 3-month forecast horizon is significantly inferior to that of forecast time series with a 12-month forecast horizon.
The on average a little better U 2 -results of the 3-months US-Treasury bill rate forecasts can probably be ascribed to the long lateral movement of the Treasury bill rate between the end of 1994 and mid of 1999. Lateral movements support the topically oriented trend adjustment behavior of financial analysts.
The graphic analysis shows the exaggerated cautiousness of the bond market analysts.
While they speedily reflect interest rate increases in their forecasts, they wait for some This examination results are especially serious for two reasons:
1. Sources for the review were banks, insurance companies, other financial services companies, research-and consulting institutes, associations, and industrial companies: a cross-section through the U.S. forecast landscape. The fact that not a single one of the reviewed institutions could achieve satisfying forecast results nourishes the suspicion that the presented outcome is characteristic for the whole guild of interest rate forecasters.
2. The examined forecast data on average cover a period of nine years, some even more than fourteen years. Therefore it can be excluded that the bad forecast results might be the consequence of an "adverse" period of time.
The practical consequences arising from the unsatisfying quality of the interest rate forecasts are extensive:
In the face of the weaknesses regarding the forecast of the market-determining 10-year US-Government bond yields and the 3-month US-Treasury bill rates a reliable forecast of the future interest rate development seems, on the whole, not to be guaranteed. Therefore, it is not possible to master the risk of changing interest rates when dealing with maturity transformation solely with the help of interest rate forecasts. A critical inspection into the maturity transformation volume as well as a consistent use of the known procedures of risk evaluation and -limitation appears to be urgently recommended before the background of this study results.
Without the necessary reliability of interest rate forecasts, active investment strategies in the bond market can not lead to the desired success, namely the achievement of systematic surplus yields. As active investment strategies are also relatively expensive, a stringent orientation to passive investment strategies should be pursued.
Before the background of the low reliability of interest rate forecasts established here also other financial market forecasts should be critically examined on their accuracy, because fundamental stock market-and exchange rate forecasts normally rely on assumptions on the future interest rate development. All research results should be subject to a thorough, systematical controlling to avoid false assumptions regarding one's own forecast competence.
Finally, industrial companies should not depend their timing of real investments on expected changes of the cost of finance.
The findings of the present study may lead to further interesting areas of research:
What is the reason of the timid behavior of financial analysts? Why do they so strongly align their forecasts to present interest rate levels, although for years this has only led to drastic failure? Do anchoring-heuristics or possible rational herd behavior of financial analysts play a role here? 
